Abstract. We study quantum period finding algorithms such as Simon, Shor, and Ekerå-Håstad. For a periodic function f these algorithms produce -via some quantum embedding of f -a quantum superposition x |x |f (x) , which requires a certain amount of output bits that represent |f (x) . We show that we can lower this amount to a single output qubit by hashing f down to a single bit. Namely, we replace the embedding of f in quantum period finding circuits by several embeddings of hashed versions of f . We show that on expectation this modification only doubles the required amount of quantum measurements, while significantly reducing the total number of qubits. For example, for Simon's period finding algorithm in some n-bit function f : F n 2 → F n 2 our hashing technique reduces the required qubits from 2n down to n + 1. For the Ekerå-Håstad algorithm for factoring n-bit RSA our hashing reduces the required qubits from ( + o(1))n.
Introduction
Although there is steady progress in constructing larger quantum computers, within the next years the number of quantum bits seems to be too limited for tackling problems of interesting size, e.g. for period finding applications in cryptography [8, 7, 9, 14, 12, 6, 13] Shor's algorithm [16] for polynomial time factorization of n-bit numbers computes a superposition x |x |f (x) with 2n input qubits representing the input |x to f (sometimes also called control qubits) and n output qubits representing the output |f (x) of the function (sometimes also called arithmetic qubits).
However, it may not be necessary to implement a full-fledged 3n-qubit Shor algorithm in order to factor numbers or compute discrete logarithms. Quantum computers with a very limited number of qubits might still serve as a powerful oracle that assists us in speeding up classical computations. For instance, Bernstein, Biasse and Mosca [2] developed an algorithm that factors n-bit numbers with the help of only a sublinear amount of n 2 3 qubits in subexponential time that is (slightly) faster than the currently best known purely classical factorization algorithm.
Several other algorithms saved on the number of qubits in Shor's algorithm by shifting some more work into a classical post-processing, while -in contrast to [2] -still preserving polynomial run time. Interestingly, all these algorithms concentrate on reducing the input qubits, while keeping n output qubits. Seifert [15] showed that -using for the classical post-process simultaneous Diophantine approximations instead of continued fractions -the number of input qubits can be reduced from 2n to (1 + o(1))n. For n-bit RSA numbers, which are a product of two n/2-bit primes, Ekerå and Håstad [5] reduced the number of input qubits down to ( Mosca and Ekert [11] showed that in principle one can reduce the number of input qubits even down to a single one, at the cost of an increased depth of Shor's quantum circuit. However, we currently do not see how to combine the Mosca-Ekert algorithm with our new hashing technique.
Our contribution. We hash f (x) in the output qubits down to a single qubit. This can be realized using quantum embeddings of h • f for different hash functions h. Our basic observation is that hashing preserves the periodicity of f . Namely, if f (x) = f (x + s) for some period s and all inputs x then also h(f (x)) = h(f (x + s)) for the period s and all inputs x.
The drawback of hashing is of course that h introduces many more undesirable collisions h(f (x)) = h(f (x )) where x, x are not a multiple of s apart. Surprisingly, even for 1-bit range hash functions this plethora of undesirable collisions does not at all affect the correctness of our quantum period finding algorithms, and only insignificantly increases their runtimes.
More precisely, concerning correctness we show that a replacement of f by some hashed version of f has the following effects.
Simon's algorithm: In the input qubits, we still measure only vectors y that are orthogonal to the period s. The amplitudes of all other inputs cancel out. Shor's algorithm: Let the period be d = 2 r , and let us use q > r input qubits. Then we still measure in the input qubits only numbers y that are multiples 2 q−r . The amplitudes of all other inputs cancel out. In the case of general (not only power of two) periods and in Ekerå-Håstad's algorithm we measure all inputs y = 0 with exactly half the probability as without hashing.
Our correctness property immediately implies that the original post-processing in Simon's algorithm (Gaussian elimination) and in Shor's algorithm (e.g. continued fractions) can still be used in the hashed version of the algorithms for period recovery.
However, this does not imply that we achieve similar runtimes. Namely, in the original algorithms of Simon and Shor we measure all y having a non-zero amplitude with a uniform probability distribution. In Simon's algorithm for some period s ∈ F n 2 we obtain each of the 2 n−1 many y ∈ F n 2 orthogonal to s with probability 1 2 n−1 . In Shor's algorithm with period d = 2 r , we measure each of the d many possible multiples y of 2 q−r with probability 1 d . These uniform probability distributions are destroyed by moving to the hashed version of the algorithms. Since h(f (x)) = h(f (x )) for x = x happens for universal 1-bit range hash functions with probability 1 2 , the undesirable collisions put a probability weight of (roughly) 1 2 on measuring y = 0 in the input qubits.
This seems to be bad news, since neither in Simon's algorithm does the zero vector y provide information about s, nor does in Shor's algorithmus the zero-multiple y of 2 q−r provide information about d. However as good news, we show that besides putting probability weight 1 2 on y = 0, hashing does not destroy the probability distribution stemming from the amplitudes of quantum period finding algorithms. Namely, we show that for the whole class of quantum period finding circuits that we consider -including Simon, Shor and Ekerå-Håstad -the following result holds. If the probability to measure y is p(y) when using f , then we obtain probability p(y)/2 (taken over the random choice of h from a family of universal hash functions) to measure y when using h • f .
Put differently, if we condition on the event that we do not measure y = 0 in the input bits (which happens in roughly every second measurement) in both cases -using f itself or its hashed version h • f -we obtain exactly the same probability distribution for the measurements of any y = 0. This implies that our hashing approach preserves not only the correctness but also the runtime analysis of any processing of the measured data in a classical post-process. Thus, at the cost of only twice as many quantum measurements we save all but one of the output qubits.
In particular, we show that the original Simon algorithm [18] -that recovers for a periodic function f : F n 2 → F n 2 its period in time polynomial in n with expected n + 1 measurements using 2n qubits -admits a hashed version with expected 2(n + 1) measurements using only n + 1 qubits.
The original Ekerå-Håstad version of Shor's algorithm that computes discrete logarithms d in some abelian group G in polynomial time using (1 + o(1)) log d + log(|G|) qubits requires in its hashed version only (1 + o(1)) log d qubits. Moreover, the Ekerå-Håstad algorithm computes the factorization of an RSA modulus N = pq of bit-size n in time polynomial in n using ( 3 2 + o(1))n qubits, whereas our hashed version reduces this to only ( 1 2 + o(1))n qubits. On the downside, our hashing technique requires that we obtain quantum embeddings of h • f for several h chosen uniformly at random from a family of universal hash functions. Notice that it is of course not sufficient to compute f first, and afterwards hash the result, since this would require qubits for representing the full range of f . It remains an interesting open problem, which classes of functions f admit the memory-efficient computation of hashed versions, which is out of the scope of our paper. However, we believe that our independent choices of h from a universal hash function family is mainly a theoretical proof artefact. We conjecture that in practice a single h should still work perfectly. Even choosing h simply as the projection of f to a single bit should work for most functions of interest.
Our paper is organized as follows. The results for Simon's algorithm are described in Section 3. For didactic reasons, we study in Section 4 first the simple case of Shor's algorithm for periods that are a power of two. In Section 5, we generalize to any quantum circuits that fall in our period finding class. As a consequence, in Section 5 we obtain a hashed version of Shor's algorithm with general periods and in Section 6 a hashed version of Ekerå-Håstad.
Preliminaries on Period Finding Algorithms
Let us first recall some quantum notation. The reversible quantum embedding of a classical function f is defined as U f : |x |y → |x |y + f (x) .
The 1-qubit Hadamard gate realizes the mapping
(−1) xy |y . Its n-qubit version is defined as the n-fold tensor product H n = n i=1 H 1 . The n-qubit Quantum Fourier Transform (QFT) realizes the mapping
2 n y |y .
Definition 2.1. A hash function family H t := {h : D → {0, 1} t } is universal if for all x, y ∈ D, x = y we have
It is easy to see that strongly 2-universal hash function families as defined in [10] are universal in the sense of Definition 2.1.
Hashed-Simon
Let us briefly recall Simon's original algorithm. Let f : F n 2 → F n 2 be periodic with period s ∈ F n 2 , that is f (x) = f (x + s) for all x ∈ F n 2 . We call f a Simon function if it defines a (2 : 1)-mapping, i.e.
f (x) = f (y) ⇔ (y = x) or (y = x + s).
The use of Simon functions allows for a clean theoretical analysis, although Simon's algorithm works also for more general periodic functions as shown in [1, 4, 9] . For ease of notation, we will restrict ourselves to Simon functions. The Simon circuit Q Simon f from Figure 1 uses n input and n output qubits for realizing the embedding of f . It can easily be shown that in the n input qubits we measure only y ∈ F n 2 such that y ⊥ s, i.e. ys = 0. with some hash function h freshly drawn from a universal t-bit range hash function family H t . Notice that Simon can be considered as special case of Hashed-Simon, where we choose t = n and the identity function h = id. This slightly abuses notation, since H n = {id} is not universal. However, in the following Lemma 3.1 we do not need universality. In Lemma 3.1 we show the correctness property of Hashed-Simon that by replacing Q Simon f with Q Simon h•f , we still measure only y orthogonal to s.
on |0 n |0 t for some freshly chosen h ∈ R H t .
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Let y be the measurement of the n input qubits. 10 end Lemma 3.1 (Orthogonality). Let f : F n 2 → F n 2 be a Simon function with period s, h :
Let us apply Q h•f on |0 n |0 t and measure z in the last t qubits. Then we obtain superposition y∈F n 2 y⊥s w y,z |y |z , where w y,z = 1 (2 n · |f
xy .
Proof. Since f is a Simon function we have f (x) = f (x + s) and therefore
By assumption we measure z in the last t qubits. Therefore the first n qubits collapse to the uniform superposition over all preimages f
, we obtain in the first n qubits
An application of H n now yields
xy |y .
The statement of the lemma follows.
From Lemma 3.1's superposition
we see that only y ∈ F n 2 with y ⊥ s have a non-vanishing amplitude w y,z . Recall also that Lemma 3.1 contains the analysis of Simon's original algorithm as the special case, where h is the identity function. In this case, we know that by the definition of a Simon function |f The following lemma will be useful, when we analyse superpositions over all z. Proof. Fix y = 0 n . If y ⊥ s then all w y,z = 0 and thus the claim follows. Hence, in the following let
Since f is a Simon function, f is a (2:1)-mapping. Thus
Using the definition of w y,z in Eq. (1) with h = id and |f −1 (z)| = 2 yields 1 2
xy Since for y = 0 we have x∈F n 2 (−1) xy = 0, the claim follows.
Let us now first develop some intuition for the amplitudes w y,z in Eq. (1) for hash functions h : F n 2 → F 2 . We expect that |f
We first look at the amplitude of |y = |0 n . Since for all x ∈ F n 2 we have (−1) xy = 1, the amplitude of |0 n adds up to
. Hence, we expect to measure the zero-vector 0 n with probability approximately . This seems to be bad news, since the the zero-vector is the only one orthogonal to s that does not provide any information about s.
However, we show that all y ⊥ s with y = 0 n still appear with significant amplitude. Intuitively, . This in turn implies that conditioned on the event that we do not measure 0 n (which happens with probability roughly 1 2 ), we still obtain the uniform distribution over all remaining y ⊥ s.
We make our intuition formal in the following lemma.
Theorem 3.1. Let H 1 = {h : F n 2 → {0, 1}} be universal, and let f be a Simon function with period s. Then we measure in Algorithm Hashed-Simon in the first n qubits any y ⊥ s, y = 0 with probability 1 2 n , where the probability is taken over the random choice of h ∈ H 1 . Proof. From Lemma 3.1, we conclude that Hashed-Simon gives us a superposition z∈F n 2 y∈F n 2 y⊥s w y,z |y |z , where w y,z = 1 (2 n · |f
In particular for z ∈ f (F n 2 ) we have w y,z = 0. Let us first look at the special case h = id, that is we use the original Simon algorithm with |f −1 h (z)| = 2. In this case we measure any y ⊥ s with probability 1 2 n−1 . By Eq. (1), we also measure any y with probability z∈F n 2 |w y,z | 2 . Since w y,z ∈ R, we obtain |w y,z | 2 = w 2 y,z and hence the identity
Now, let us look at Hashed-Simon with a single-bit output hash function h ∈ H 1 . Let us denote by p = P h∈H 1 [y] the probability that we measure y in the first n qubits. Our goal is to show that p = 1 2 n . For some h ∈ H 1 we denote
2 ) and w y,z ∈ R, Hashed-Simon yields
In Eq. (3) we obtain a cross-product w y,z 1 w y,z 2 for z 1 = z 2 iff z 1 , z 2 are in the same set I h,b , b ∈ {0, 1}, i.e. iff h(z 1 ) = h(z 2 ). Using Definition 2.1 of a universal hash function family, we obtain
for any z 1 = z 2 . This implies that for exactly half of all h ∈ H 1 we obtain h(z 1 ) = h(z 2 ).
Further using w y,z = 0 for z / ∈ f (F n 2 ), we conclude that
From Lemma 3.2 we know that 0 = Theorem 3.2. Let H 1 = {h : F n 2 → {0, 1}} be universal, and let f : F n 2 → F n 2 be a Simon function with period s ∈ F n 2 . Hashed-Simon recovers s with expected 2(n + 1) applications of quantum circuits Q Simon h•f , h ∈ R H 1 , that use only n + 1 qubits.
Proof. Let us define a random variable X i , 1 ≤ i < n for the number of applications of Q Simon h•f until Hashed-Simon finds i linearly independent y 1 . . . y i . Let E i be the event that we already have i − 1 linearly independent Y = {y 1 , . . . , y i−1 } and we measure some y i / ∈ span(Y ). Define p i = P[E i ]. Using Theorem 3.1, we obtain
Since |span{y 1 . . . , y i−1 }| = 2 i−1 , we obtain from Theorem 3.1 more generally
Clearly, X i is geometrically distributed with parameter p i . Let X = X 1 + . . . + X n−1 denote the number of required applications of Q Simon
Since
For ease of notation, let us first focus on applying Shor's algorithm for factorization. In Section 6 we will also see an application for discrete logarithms.
Let N ∈ N be a composite n-bit number of unknown factorization, and let a be chosen uniformly at random from Z * N , the multiplicative group modulo N . Let us define the function f :
It is well-known that we can compute a non-trivial factor of N in probabilistic polynomial time given d = ord N (a) [17] . We encode the inputs of f withubits.
In order to find d, Shor uses the quantum circuit Q Shor f from Figure 2 . In Q Shor f we measure in the q input qubits with high probability y that are close to some multiple of with its hashed version Q Shor h•f . Notice that Shor is a special case of Hashed-Shor for the choice t = log 2 (N ) and H t = {id}. For this choice H t is not universal, but we do not need universality in the following Lemma 4.1 about the superposition produced by Q h•f . From Lemma 4.1 we conclude correctness of Hashed-Shor for any t-bit range hash function h.
Run Q Shor h•f on |0 q |0 t for some freshly chosen h ∈ R H t .
Let y be the measurement of the q input qubits. until |Y | is sufficiently large. 
Proof. In Q Shor h•f , we apply on input |0 q |0 t first the operation H q ⊗I t followed by 
and the amplitudes of |y |z k with z k = a k mod N are
For didactical reasons and ease of notation, let us look in the subsequent section at the special case of periods d that are powers of two. In Section 5, we analyse the general d case.
Periods that are a power of two
Let d = 2 r for some r ∈ N with r ≤ q. Then max{c ∈ N | cd + k < 2 q } = 
respectively for h : Z N → {0, 1} as
Notice that the factor 1 √ m · 2 q m−1 c=0 e 2πi cd 2 q y is identical in |Φ and its hashed version |Φ h . Further notice that the factor is independent of z k and z. In the following lemma we show that for a measurement of any |y , where y is a multiple of m, this factor contributes to the probability with We now show that the same common factor ensures that in both superpositions |Φ and its hashed version |Φ h we never measure some |y where y is not a multiple of m. Lemma 4.3. Let d = 2 r ≤ 2 q and y ∈ {0, . . . , 2 q − 1} with m y. Then we measure |y in either |Φ or |Φ h from Equation (6) or (7) with probability 0. Indeed, in Shor's original algorithm is uniformly distributed since the first factor in Eq. (6) satisfies for any y
Similar to the reasoning in Section 3, we show that in the case of the hashed version |Φ h we obtain any |y with y = 0 with probability 1 2d , where the probability is taken over the random choice of the hash function. This implies that we measure for |Φ h the useless y = 0 with probability , where the probability is taken over the random choice of h ∈ H 1 .
Proof. Let us denote by p h = P h∈H 1 [y] the probability that we measure y in Hashed-Shor in the q input qubits. By Lemma 4.1, Eq. (7) and Lemma 4.2 we know that for all y = m = 2 q d we have
Observe that for k 1 = k 2 we obtain a cross-product
This implies that for exactly half of all h ∈ H 1 we obtain h(a k 1 mod N ) = h(a k 2 mod N ). Therefore,
Since k 1 − k 2 = 0, we can rewrite as
From Theorem 4.1 we see that in the hashed version |Φ h we measure every y = m , y = 0 with probability 1 2d , whereas in comparison in |Φ we measure every y = m with probability 1 d . It follows that in Eq. (7) the scaling factor
takes on expected value 1 2 for y = m, 0 < < d taken over all h ∈ H 1 . Notice that S is a symmetric function in y, i.e. S(y) = S(2 q − y).
Let us look at an example to illustrate how the probabilities behave. We choose N = 51 = 3 · 17, a = 2 and q = 12. This implies d = ord N (a) = 8 and m = Proof. In Shor we compute the fraction For comparison, we need in Shor's original algorithm with the non-hashed version of f on expectation 2 measurements until we find d.
Hashed Shor: Finding Periods in General
Notice that we proved in Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 4.1 that when we move to the hashed version of our quantum circuits all probabilities to measure some y = 0 decrease exactly by a factor of 1 2 (over the random choice the hash function).
The same is true for finding arbitrary (non power of two) periods with circuit Q Shor h•f . However, this does not immediately follow from the proof of Theorem 4.1, because the proof builds on the special form of superposition |Φ h from Eq. (7) that only holds if d is a power of two. Here we show a more general result for period finding algorithms that applies for Shor's original circuit as well as for its Ekerå-Håstad variant in the subsequent section. To this end let us define a generic period finding quantum circuit Q Period f (see Figure 4) . In Figure 4 we denote by Q 1 , Q 2 any quantum circuitry that acts on the q input qubits. For example, for Simon's circuit we have Q 1 = Q 2 = H q (see Figure 1 ). For Shor's circuit we have Q 1 = H q and Q 2 = QFT q . In the following Theorem 5.1 we will define explicitly a cancellation criterion that this circuitry Q 1 , Q 2 has to fulfill. An important feature of Q Period f is however that we apply f only once. 
on |0 q |0 t for some freshly chosen h ∈ R H t .
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Let y be the measurement of the q input qubits. The proof of the following theorem closely follows the reasoning in proof of Theorem 3.1. Here we show that the probabilities exactly half in the hashed version if a certain cancellation criterion (Equation (9)) is met.
Theorem 5.1. Let f : {0, 1} q → {0, 1} n and H 1 = {h : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}} be universal. Let Q Period f be a quantum circuit that on input |0 q |0 n yields superposition
w y,f (x) = 0 for any y = 0. (9) Let us denote by p(y), respectively p h (y), the probability to measure some |y , y = 0 in the q input qubits when applying Q Period
Proof. For ease of notation let us denote z = f (x). By definition, we have p(y) = z∈Im(f ) |w y,z | 2 . Now let us find an expression for p h (y) when using Q Period
In Eq. (10) we obtain a cross-product w y,z 1 w y,z 2 for z 1 = z 2 iff z 1 , z 2 are in the same set I h,b , b ∈ {0, 1}, i.e. iff h(z 1 ) = h(z 2 ). Using Definition 2.1 of a universal hash function family, we obtain
for any z 1 = z 2 . This implies that for exactly half of all h ∈ H we obtain h(z 1 ) = h(z 2 ). We conclude that
Our prerequisite z∈Im(f ) w y,z = 0 for any y = 0 implies 0 = 1 2
Together with the definition of p(y) we conclude that
We already showed in Lemma 3.2 that Simon's circuit Q Simon f fulfills the cancellation criterion (Equation (9)) of Theorem 5.1. Thus, the statement of Theorem 3.1 directly follows from Theorem 5.1. However, for an improved intelligibility we preferred to prove Theorem 3.1 directly.
In the following Theorem 5.2 we show that Q Shor f also meets the cancellation criterion. Thus, going to the hashed version in Shor's algorithm immediately halves all probabilities for y = 0.
Since by Theorem 5.2 Shor's circuit Q Shor f satisfies the cancellation criterion of Theorem 5.1, Theorem 5.3 implies that we can implement Shor's algorithm with q + 1 instead of q + n qubits at the cost of only twice as many measurements. In other words, we save all but one of the output qubits.
6 Hashed Ekerå-Håstad: Factoring n-bit RSA numbers with 1 2 n qubits
In 2017, Ekerå and Håstad [5] proposed a variant of Shor's algorithm for computing the discrete logarithms of x = g d in polynomial time with only (1 + o(1)) log d input qubits. The Ekerå-Håstad algorithm saves input qubits in comparison to Shor's original discrete logarithm algorithm whenever d is significantly smaller than the group order.
An interesting application of such a small discrete logarithm algorithm is the factorization of n-bit RSA moduli N = pq, where p, q are primes of the same bit-size.
Hence, we obtain a discrete logarithm instance in Z * N where the desired logarithm d = )n input and n outbit qubits, using a classical post-process that takes time polynomial in n and s s . Choosing s = log n log log n , we obtain a polynomial time factoring algorithm with a total of ( 3 2 + o(1))n qubits. In the following, we show that the Ekerå-Håstad algorithm is covered by our framework of quantum period finding algorithms which fulfill the cancellation criterion of Equation (9) from Theorem 5.1. Thus, by Theorem 5.3 we can save all but 1 of the n output qubits via hashing, at the cost of only doubling the number of quantum measurements. This in turn leads to a polynomial time factorization algorithm for n-bit RSA numbers using only ( 1 2 + o(1))n qubits. Concerning discrete logarithms, with our hashing approach we can quantumly compute d from g and g d in polynomial time using only (1 + o(1)) log d qubits.
Let (g, x = g d , S(G)) be a discrete logarithm instance with m = log d. Here S(G) specifies how we compute in the group G generated by g, e.g. S(G) = N specifies that we compute modulo N in the group G = Z * N . Define e 2πi(aj+2 m bk)/2 m+ |j, k, f g,x,S(G) (a, b) .
The main step in the analysis of Ekerå-Håstad shows that we measure in the m+2 = (1+ Since by prerequisite (j, k) = (0, 0) ∈ Z 2 m+ × Z 2 , we have j = 0 mod 2 m+ or k = 0 mod 2 . This implies that at least one of the factors is identical 0. 
